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Abstract. From 29th March to 3rd April 2009 the Dagstuhl Seminar
09141 Web Application Security was held in Schloss Dagstuhl  Leib-
niz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants pre-
sented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were
discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar are
put together in this paper. Links to full papers (if available) are provided
in the corresponding seminar summary document.
Keywords. Web applications, Security, Ajax, Web 2.0, Analysis for se-
curity, Browser design, Distributed applications
09141 Executive Summary  Web Application Security
Web applications are ubiquitous nowadays. Consequently, the ﬁeld of Web ap-
plication security is of ever rising signiﬁcance. This Dagstuhl seminar was con-
ducted to assemble researchers active in the domain to gain a ﬁrst comprehensive
overview of this young discipline in security research. From a content perspective,
the topic was explored in a great variety of directions, including for instance Web
browser-based security measures, language-based techniques, software engineer-
ing centric methods, run-time enforcement, static analysis, or formal approaches.
Keywords: Web applications, Security, Ajax, Web 2.0, Analysis for security,
Browser design, Distributed applications
Joint work of: Boneh, Dan; Erlingsson, Ulfar; Johns, Martin; Livshits, Ben-
jamin
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2725
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Network Layer 8: The Information Layer
Kevin Borders (Univ. of Michigan - Ann Arbor, US)
Each layer in the network stack adds a level of abstraction to simplify com-
munication. The current top of the network stack, the application layer (layer
7), contains arbitrary-length messages between client and server. Large portions
of these messages, however, are constrained by web protocols. Much like TCP
and IP headers, constrained ﬁelds in HTTP messages serve only as a vehicle for
higher-level communication. This work identiﬁes a new top layer in the network
stack: the information layer. Consider the search term in a web search, such as a
"security." In a HTTP request, this term is part of the information layer, while
everything else, including headers and ﬁxed protocol ﬁelds, is part of the lower
application layer.
Identifying and isolating the information layer enables a variety of novel secu-
rity systems. The lower application-layer ﬁelds can be checked against the HTTP
and HTML speciﬁcations to discover illicit communication. An information-layer
proxy can receive keyboard and mouse events from the client, and then gener-
ate HTTP requests on its behalf. Such a proxy has the potential to completely
thwart malicious tunneling over the Internet as we know it today. This talk ex-
plores the design and security implications of systems that separate information
layer data from today's web traﬃc, and suggests future research directions in
the area.
Joint work of: Borders, Kevin; Prakash, Atul
Know Thyself
Dieter Gollmann (TU Hamburg-Harburg, DE)
We suggest to treat current challenges in web applications security such as cross-
site scripting not as code-injection attacks but as failures of authentication. Here,
authentication refers to the origin of HTML requests and responses, and of their
individual components. In this framework, we can investigate to which extent
limited ﬂavours of authentication, such as being able to recognize ones own
requests, can be an eﬀective basis of enforcing origin-based security policies.
Keywords: Authentication, recognition, cross-site scripting
Blue Sky: Topics and summary
Ulfar Erlingsson (Reykjavik University, IS)
An open discussion among seminar attendees: Can we get a clearer, usable def-
inition of Web application security?
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What about Web applications by themselves? If we step back from the attacks
and mechanisms that we have been focusing on, can we reach agreement on a
security policy that we want our mechanisms to enforce? Even if we have to do
away with legacy support, and start from ﬁrst principles, could we get precise,
useful working deﬁnitions? A summary describes a handful of points where the
seminar seemed in concensus.
Safe Extensions for the Web: Overview of technologies
Ulfar Erlingsson (Reykjavik University, IS)
Numerous technologies can be used to implement extension frameworks that pro-
vide basic safety properties. Safe higher-level languages with garbage collection
are not the only option. Hardware-based isolation, fast machine-code interpre-
tation, and statically-veriﬁable machine-code binaries are all viable alternatives,
each with slightly diﬀerent safety properties and tradeoﬀs. By correctly using
such technologies, one can get to the hard questions, which are the same as for
JavaScript extensions: how to ensure safety for the interfaces at the boundary
of an extension.
User-Interface Shepherding: Thwarting UI Redressing
Attacks with Veriﬁable User Actions
David Evans (University of Virginia, US)
User intentions are at the heart of security, but not considered by current systems
in any systematic way. Information about user intentions can be used to con-
struct better access control policies, thwart misdirection attacks such as phish-
ing and clickjacking, and support other security techniques such as anomaly-
based intrusion detection. Any decisions based on user intentions require a se-
cure method for collecting user behavior including information about the user
interface elements with which the user is interacting.
We present a method for securely recording user interactions with graphical
user interfaces. Our approach combines direct observation of user interface ele-
ments within the operating system with external observation of user input and
graphical output. We use comparisons with bitmap images to verify the visual
consistency of the user interface elements. We demonstrate that policies taking
advantage of information about user intentions can limit damage caused by mal-
ware and thwart misdirection attacks such as clickjacking and cross-site-request
forgery.
Joint work of: Shirley, Jeﬀrey; Evans, David
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Universally Composable Framework for the Analysis of
Browser-based Protocols
Sebastian Gajek (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
Browser-based security protocols perform cryptographic tasks within the design
constraints of commodity browsers. They are the bearer protocols for many
security critical applications on the Internet. Roughly speaking, they are the
oﬀspring of key exchange and secure sessions protocols. Although browser-based
protocols are widely deployed, their security has not been thourghly proved under
standard cryptographic assumptions. Unfortunately, the lack of precise protocol
deﬁnitions and of underlying formal models hampers the systematic design and
a cryptographically faithful analysis of browser-based protocols.
We present a security model for the analysis of this important class of pro-
tocols based on the Universal Composability framework [Canetti, FOCS'01].
Keywords: Universal Composition, Design, Analysis, Browser-based protocols
Mostly Static Enforcement of Security and Reliability
Policies for JavaScript
Salvatore Guarnieri (University of Washington, US)
The advent of Web 2.0 has lead to the proliferation of client-side code that is
typically written in JavaScript. This code is often combined or mashed-up with
other code and content from disparate, mutually untrusting parties, leading to
undesirable security and reliability consequences.
This work proposes GATEKEEPER, a mostly static approach for soundly en-
forcing security and reliability policies for JavaScript programs. GATEKEEPER
is a highly extensible system with a rich, expressive policy language, allowing the
hosting site administrator to formulate their policies as succinct Datalog queries.
The primary application of GATEKEEPER is in reasoning about JavaScript
widgets such as those hosted by widget portals Live.com and Google/IG. Wid-
gets submitted to these sites can be either malicious or just buggy and poorly
written, and the hosting site has the authority to reject the submission of widgets
that do not meet the site's security or reliability policies. To show the practicality
of our approach, we describe nine representative security and reliability policies.
While no obviously malicious widgets were discovered, widgets were found to
pollute the global namespace, modify built-in objects, and violate suggestions
provided by the widget hosting site.
Joint work of: Guarnieri, Salvatore; Livshits, Benjamin
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Penetration Testing with Improved Input Vector
Identiﬁcation
William Halfond (Georgia Institute of Technology, US)
Penetration testing is widely used to help ensure the security of web applications.
It discovers vulnerabilities by simulating attacks from malicious users on a tar-
get application. Identifying the input vectors of a web application and checking
the results of an attack are important parts of penetration testing, as they in-
dicate where an attack could be introduced and whether an attempted attack
was successful. Current techniques for identifying input vectors and checking
attack results are typically ad-hoc and incomplete, which can cause parts of an
application to be untested and leave vulnerabilities undiscovered. In this paper,
we propose a new approach to penetration testing that addresses these limita-
tions by leveraging two recently developed analysis techniques. The ﬁrst is used
to identify a web application's possible input vectors, and the second is used
to automatically check whether an attack resulted in an injection. To empiri-
cally evaluate our approach, we compare it against a state-of-the-art, alternative
technique.
Our results show that our approach performs a more thorough penetration
testing and leads to the discovery of more vulnerabilities.
Joint work of: Halfond, William G.J.; Roy Choudhary, Shauvik; Orso, Alessan-
dro
Security Challenges in Enterprise Mashups
Jochen Haller (SAP AG - Walldorf, DE)
The Web 2.0 motivates end users to create and share contents. Numerous new
technologies, e.g. to create service mashups, emerged that allow for simpliﬁed cre-
ation, sharing and composition of this user created content. When used in a pri-
vate context, security and privacy issues are frequently neglected. This changes
when mashup technologies are applied to relate and combine not only personal,
but also security critical corporate data in so-called enterprise mashups.
This talk presents work in progress that intends to provide a software ar-
chitecture for a secure and privacy aware provisioning of enterprise mashup
technology to corporate end users. Security challenges from a technology, but
also organisational and process perspective are presented, as well as measures
addressing those according to corporate policy.
Type-directed coercion insertion for security enforcement
Michael Hicks (University of Maryland - College Park, US)
A number of important program rewriting scenarios can be recast as type-
directed coercion insertion.
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These range from more theoretical applications such as coercive subtyping
and supporting overloading in type theories, to more practical applications such
as integrating static and dynamically typed code using gradual typing, and inlin-
ing code to enforce security policies such as access control, tainting, and prove-
nance tracking. In this work we give a general theory of type-directed coercion
insertion based on generating and inserting coercions. We speciﬁcally explore the
inherent tradeoﬀ between expressiveness and ambiguity the more powerful the
strategy for generating coercions, the greater the possibility of several, seman-
tically distinct rewritings for a given program. To demonstrate the potential of
our approach to security concerns, we work out two examples in detail, one for
ensuring sanitization of user data when constructing HTML documents, and one
for tracking provenance in database computations.
Keywords: Type coercion, program rewriting, security enforcement
Joint work of: Swamy, Nikhil; Hicks, Michael; Bierman, Gavin S.
Protecting Browsers Against Drive-By Download Attacks
Thorsten Holz (Universität Mannheim, DE)
Nowadays, one common attack vector is a so called drive-by download attack.
In this scenario, an attacker lures the victim into opening a website, which then
tries to exploit a vulnerability in the visitor's web browser. Recent studies by
Provos et al. and our own observations show that this attack vector is getting
more and more popular within the attacker community. We thus need better
protection mechanisms to inhibit this kind of attacks.
One possibility to prohibit certain kinds of drive-by download attacks lies in
the fact that these attacks are commonly carried out with the help of JavaScript
and a technique called heap spraying. By analyzing the web site and especially
the JavaScript code delivered to the web browser, we can thus detect certain
classes of attacks. We implemented a tool to perform both static and dynamic
analysis for a given website: In the static analysis part, we check diﬀerent prop-
erties of the site, e.g., whether or not iFrames are included, from which domain
additional content is loaded, and if the JavaScript on the site matches speciﬁc
malicious signatures. In the dynamic analysis phase, we execute the script within
the JavaScript interpreter Spidermonkey, instrument the execution, and try to
detect anomalies during runtime. The tool itself is implemented as a browser
helper object (BHO) to enable an integration into Internet Explorer.
In this talk, we discuss the current state of the project and preliminary
results. Furthermore, we present real-world experience with client honeypots, i.e.,
honeypots that are used to study malicious websites. Based on these observations
the limitations of all client-side instrumentations / browser-based protection
mechanisms become clear.
Joint work of: Holz, Thorsten; Dewald, Andreas
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2020 Foresight: Web application security in 11 years
Trevor Jim (AT&T Research - Florham Park, US)
Transformative technologies often take 40+ years to progress from invention to
widespread deploymentI will illustrate this with several historical examples
related to security. This fact has both good and bad implications. The bad
news is that you may have to wait several decades for your Turing Award. The
good news is that the next important advances in web application security have
already been in the pipeline for several decades, even preceding the web; we
can predict them, and position our research to anticipate their adoption. In this
talk I will give my predictions for two security technologies which will come to
fruition in the next decade in web applications.
Secure Code Generation for Web Applications
Martin Johns (Universität Passau, DE)
A large percentage of recent security problems, such as Cross-site Scripting or
SQL injection, is caused by string-based code injection vulnerabilities. Most of
these vulnerabilities exist because of implicit code creation through string serial-
ization. Based on an analysis of the vulnerability class underlying mechanisms,
we propose a general approach to outﬁt modern programming languages with
mandatory means for explicit and secure code generation which provide strict
separation between data and code. Using an exempliﬁed implementation for the
languages Java and HTML/JavaScript respectively, we show how our approach
can be realized and enforced.
Practical Prevention of XSS in Google Web Toolkit
Applications through Coding Discipline and Light-Weight
Static Checking
Christoph Kern (Google Switzerland, CH)
Google Web Toolkit is an open-source development framework for AJAX web
applications. Client-side application code is developed in Java and compiled into
JavaScript for deployment.
Like all web applications, GWT-based apps can be vulnerable to XSS vulner-
abilities unless developers take appropriate precautions. We present a practical
approach aimed at helping software engineers develop and maintain GWT ap-
plications that are free of XSS with a high degree of conﬁdence. We achieve this
goal by combining a (from a developer's point of view reasonable and acceptable)
coding discipline with light-weight static checking.
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Verifying XSS and XSRF protection and web-based
two-party secure computation
Florian Kerschbaum (SAP Research, Karlsruhe, DE)
The ﬁrst part is going to introduce a formal veriﬁcation of a simple XSS and
XSRF protection method. We model the basics of an XSS attack and a simple
protection method of checking the referer string on pages with input in the model
checker Alloy. One can verify that the model is powerful enough to capture XSS
attacks and second that the protection method prevents them.
The second part presents an experimental architecture for running a two-
party secure computation as a web application. Oﬀering the secure computation
as a web application allows a diﬀerent business model of selling the service. On
the other hand we face the technical challenge of establishing a secure channel
through the web server.
Identity Theft Attacks on Social Networks
Engin Kirda (Institut Eurécom, Sophia-Antipolis Cedex, FR)
Social networking sites have been increasingly gaining popularity. Well-known
sites such as Facebook have been reporting growth rates as high as 3% per
week. Many social networking sites have millions of registered users who use
these sites to share photographs, contact long-lost friends, establish new business
contacts and to keep in touch. In this talk, I will discuss how easy it would be
for a potential attacker to launch automated crawling and identity theft attacks
against a number of popular social networking sites in order to gain access to a
large volume of personal user information.
Keywords: Social Networking, Security, Identity theft
Static Analysis of JavaScript (and its application to
intrusion detection)
Shriram Krishnamurthi (Brown Univ. - Providence, US)
We present a static control-ﬂow analysis for JavaScript programs running in a
web browser. Our analysis tackles numerous challenges posed by modern web
applications including asynchronous communication, frameworks, and dynamic
code generation. We use our analysis to extract a model of expected client be-
havior as seen from the server, and build an intrusion-prevention proxy for the
server: the proxy intercepts client requests and disables those that do not meet
the expected behavior. We insert random asynchronous requests to foil mimicry
attacks. Finally, we evaluate our technique against several real applications and
show that it protects against an attack in a widely-used web application.
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Types for JavaScript
Shriram Krishnamurthi (Brown Univ. - Providence, US)
I would be happy to talk about our in-progress, experimental work on building
a type system for JavaScript. Having tried for 15 years to build type systems
for "scripting" languages, and having largely failed to build anything that we
ﬁnd suitable, we have adopted a new strategy we call Type Enrichment, which
deﬁnes the mediated co-existence of typed and untyped code. I would be happy
to explain what all this means and how we've been doing it.
Ripley: Automatically Securing Distributed Web
Applications Through Replicated Execution (40 min)
Benjamin Livshits (Microsoft Research - Redmond, US)
Rich Internet applications are becoming increasingly distributed, as demon-
strated by the popularity of AJAX/Web 2.0 applications such as Hotmail, Google
Maps, Facebook, and many others. A typical multi-tier AJAX application con-
sists of a server component implemented in Java J2EE, PHP or ASP.NET and a
client-side component executing in JavaScript. The resulting application is more
performant and responsive because computation is moved closer to the client,
and thus avoids unnecessary network round trips for frequent user actions.
However, once a portion of the code is moved to the client, a malicious user
can easily subvert the client side of the computation and potentially jeopar-
dize sensitive server state. In this paper we propose RIPLEY, a system that
uses replicated execution to automatically preserve the integrity of a distributed
computation. RIPLEY replicates a copy of the client-side computation on the
trusted server tier. Every client-side event is transferred to the replica of the
client for execution. RIPLEY observes results of the computation, both as com-
puted on the client-side and on the server side using the replica of the client-side
code. Any discrepancy is ﬂagged as a potential violation of computational in-
tegrity. Our evaluation of RIPLEY on ﬁve complex and representative AJAX
applications suggests that RIPLEY is a promising method for building secure
distributed web applications.
Language-Based Isolation of Untrusted Javascript
Sergio Maﬀeis (Imperial College London, GB)
Web sites that incorporate untrusted content may use browser- or language-
based methods to keep such content from maliciously altering pages, stealing
sensitive information, or causing other harm.
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We study language-based methods for ﬁltering and rewriting JavaScript code,
using Yahoo!'s AdSafe and Facebook's FBJS as motivating examples.
We explain the core problems by describing previously unknown vulnerabil-
ities and subtleties, and develop a foundation for improved solutions based on
an operational semantics of the full ECMA-262 language.
We also discuss how to apply our analysis to address the JavaScript isolation
problems we discovered.
Keywords: Mashup, security, javascript, semantics
The Motivation, Design And Implementation Of Caja
Jasvir Nagra (Google Inc. - Mountain View, US)
Caja is a compiler that provides isolation and safe, eﬃcient communication be-
tween html, css and javascript objects on a webpage. Its goal is to provide de-
fensive code (where the container page and other objects are protected from a
given object), oﬀensive code (where an object is able to share references with
other objects safely), support large number of existing legacy code and tools.
Caja achieves its goal by ﬁrst converting html and css into javascript. It
has two failstop javascript subsets - valija, which is very close to ECMAscript
3.1; and cajita, which is an object capability subset of javascript. Valija code is
translated into cajita which is in turn enforced with a static veriﬁer and runtime
checks.
Separating the problem into two stages considerably simpliﬁes the problem of
understanding and building the system, keeps the TCB small while supporting
a large number of legacy javascript applications.
Keywords: Caja, mashup, mutually suspicious, javascript
Lightweight Self-Protecting JavaScript
Phu Phung (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
This paper introduces a method to control JavaScript execution. The aim is
to prevent or modify inappropriate behaviour caused by e.g. malicious injected
scripts or poorly designed third-party code. The approach is based on modifying
the code so as to make it self-protecting: the protection mechanism (security
policy) is embedded into the code itself and intercepts security relevant API calls.
The challenges come from the nature of the JavaScript language: any variables
in the scope of the program can be redeﬁned, and code can be created and
run on-the-ﬂy. This creates potential problems, respectively, for tamper-prooﬁng
the protection mechanism, and for ensuring that no security relevant events
bypass the protection. Unlike previous approaches to instrument and monitor
JavaScript to enforce or adjust behaviour, the solution we propose is lightweight
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in that (i) it does not require a modiﬁed browser, and (ii) it does not require any
run-time parsing and transformation of code (including dynamically generated
code). As a result, the method has low run-time overhead compared to other
methods satisfying (i), and the lack of need for browser modiﬁcations means that
the policy can even be applied on the server to mitigate some eﬀects of cross-
site scripting bugs. We describe the implementation, and present an abstract
formalisation of the basic method. Based on this formalisation we show, as an
example, that it can soundly enforce the class of policies known as security
automata.
Keywords: JavaScript, Language Based Security, Inlined Reference Monitors,
Security Policy
Joint work of: Phung, Phu H.; Sands, David; Chudnov, Andrey
Security by Contract for web applications
Frank Piessens (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, BE)
Security by Contract (SxC) is an approach for untrusted code security developed
in the context of mobile phones. SxC is a variant of Sekar et al.'s Model Carrying
Code, where untrusted code comes with a high level model of its security relevant
behaviour. In SxC, this model is formalized as a security automaton in the style
of Schneider.
An instantiation of SxC needs techniques to check the compliance of an
application with such a model, and techniques to check whether a given model
is compatible with a given security policy.
This talk will discuss the challenges that need to be addressed to instantiate
SxC for web applications.
Keywords: Security by contract
Joint work of: Piessens, Frank; Massacci, Fabio; Desmet, Lieven
Eﬀective Taint Analysis of Web Applications
Marco Pistoia (IBM TJ Watson Research Center - Hawthorne, US)
Taint analysis is a form of information-ﬂow security analysis that tracks val-
ues originating from untrusted methods and parameters, in order to establish
whether they ﬂow into security-sensitive areas of the application. There is a
rapidly growing body of academic research on taint analysis. However, most
of the static taint-analysis algorithms that have been proposed to date do not
scale to industry-level code, fail to model essential Web-application-code arti-
facts soundly, and only address very speciﬁc types of information ﬂow and a
limited set of attack vectors.
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We have designed and implemented a static Taint Analysis for Java (TAJ)
that meets the requirements of industry-level applications. In terms of scalabil-
ity, TAJ can analyze applications of virtually any size, as it employs a set of
techniques designed to produce useful answers given limited time and space. In
terms of scope, TAJ covers a wide variety of attack vectors, and embodies tech-
niques to handle reﬂective calls, ﬂow through containers, nested taint and other
challenges that have been largely unanswered by previous works.
This seminar provides an in-depth description of the algorithms comprising
TAJ, evaluates TAJ against production-level benchmarks, and compares it with
alternative solutions.
A full paper on this work has been accepted for publications in the Proceed-
ings of the ACM SIGPLAN 2009 Conference on Programming Language Design
and Implementation (PLDI 2009), Dublin, Ireland, June 2009.
Joint work of: Omer Tripp, Marco Pistoia, Stephen Fink, Manu Sridharan
and Omri Weisman.
Keywords: Web application security, information ﬂow, integrity
Joint work of: Tripp, Omer; Pistoia, Marco; Fink, Stephen; Sridharan, Manu;
Weisman, Omri
Modular String-Sensitive Permission Analysis with
Demand-Driven Precision
Marco Pistoia (IBM TJ Watson Research Center - Hawthorne, US)
In modern software systems, programs are obtained by dynamically assembling
components. This has made it necessary to subject component providers to
access-control restrictions. What permissions should be granted to each com-
ponent? Too few permissions may cause run-time authorization failures, too
many constitute a security hole. We have designed and implemented a compos-
ite algorithm for precise static permission analysis for Java and the CLR. Unlike
previous work, the analysis is modular and fully integrated with a novel slicing-
based string analysis that is used to statically compute the string values deﬁning
a permission and disambiguate permission propagation paths. The results of our
research prototype on production-level Java code support the eﬀectiveness, prac-
ticality, and precision of our techniques, and show outstanding improvement over
previous work.
Keywords: Access control, static analysis
Joint work of: Geay, Emmanuel; Pistoia, Marco; Tateishi, Takaaki; Ryder,
Barbara; Dolby, Julian
Web Application Security 13
Supporting and Securing Programs inside Web Browsers
Charlie Reis (University of Washington, US)
Today's browsers are being placed in the role of operating systems for complex
programs from the web. Recent versions of browsers are starting to reﬂect this
new workload, providing better performance and greater robustness to failures.
Improving security is an important challenge as well, given the valuable private
data that now lives on the web. In this talk, I will discuss how new browser ar-
chitectures can help protect the user's local computer with sandboxed rendering
engines, as in Google Chrome. I will also describe challenges for architecturally
isolating a user's web accounts from each other, and ideas about how we might
achieve it.
Web Application Anomaly Detection in a Web 2.0 World
Will Robertson (Univ. California - Santa Barbara, US)
During the last decade, web applications have become an extremely popular
method of providing a diverse array of services to users.
Unfortunately, web applications have been found to contain large numbers
of vulnerabilities, most notably  but in no way limited to  cross-site script-
ing (XSS) and SQL injection. Consequently, web applications have also become
a favored target of cyber-criminals, who leverage web application vulnerabili-
ties to steal sensitive information or host malicious software. In the absence of
mitigating improvements in security, this trend is expected to continue as web
applications increase in complexity and, accordingly, in attack surface.
In this talk, we approach the problem of securing web applications from two
complementary angles. First, we discuss the state-of-the-art in web application
anomaly detection, an eﬀective black-box technique to mitigate vulnerabilities
in existing web applications, and how anomaly-based WAFs can adapt to the
increasingly distributed nature of modern web applications. Then, we present
approaches for improving the security of web applications from the design stage,
by focusing on the languages and tools used to construct web applications.
Keywords: Web applications, anomaly detection
Keynote: Towards tracking information ﬂow and release in
web applications
Andrei Sabelfeld (Chalmers UT - Göteborg, SE)
Information-ﬂow tracking in web applications is an attractive, and increasingly
popular, alternative for enforcing end-to-end conﬁdentiality and integrity.
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However, there is a gap between formal, mostly static, approaches  that
lack support for dynamic language features  and practical, mostly dynamic,
approaches  that lack soundness arguments. This talk discusses some steps
towards bridging this gap, focusing on information release on the policy side
and on combinations of static and dynamic techniques on the enforcement side.
The talk is based on joint papers with Aslan Askarov, Andrey Chudnov, and
Alejandro Russo.
Browser Based Protocols - Towards a Better Integration
of TLS
Joerg Schwenk (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, DE)
Following an analysis of generic weaknesses of today's single sign-on protocols
(SAML, MS Cardsapce, Liberty Alliance etc.), we propose three diﬀerent meth-
ods for a better integration of TLS into these protocols. The three proposed
variants are provably secure.
Keywords: SSL, TLS, SOP
Cross-tier, Label-based Security Enforcement for Web
Applications
Nikhil Swamy (Microsoft Research - Redmond, US)
This paper presents SELinks, a programming language focused on building
secure multi-tier web applications. SELinks provides a uniform programming
model, in the style of LINQ and Ruby on Rails, with language syntax for access-
ing objects residing either on the database or at the server. Object-level security
policies are expressed as labels, which are themselves fully-customizable, ﬁrst-
class objects. Access to labeled data is mediated via trusted, user-provided policy
enforcement functions.
SELinks has two novel features that ensure security policies are enforced
correctly and eﬃciently. First, SELinks uses a novel type system that allows
a protected object's type to refer to its protecting label. This way, the type
system can check that labeled data is never accessed directly by the program
without ﬁrst passing through the appropriate policy enforcement function. Sec-
ond, SELinks compiles policy enforcement code to database-resident user-deﬁned
functions, which can be called directly during query processing. Database-side
checking avoids transferring data to the server needlessly, while still allowing
policies to be expressed in a customizable and portable manner.
Our experience with two sizeable web applications, a model health-care database
and a secure wiki with ﬁne-grained security policies, indicates that cross-tier pol-
icy enforcement in SELinks is ﬂexible, relatively easy to use, and, when compared
to a single-tier approach, improves throughput by nearly an order of magnitude.
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Joint work of: Corcoran, Brian; Hicks, Michael; Swamy, Nikhil
The signiﬁcance and costs of supporting hypertext
isolation in existing browsers
V. N. Venkatakrishnan (Univ. of Illinois - Chicago, US)
These are times of tremendous progress for the World Wide Web which has
evolved from being a HTML document delivery system to a complex application
platform. Yet, despite these advances, today's web standards don't support a
simple, pragmatic isolation facility that can instruct a browser to demarcate
certain regions of a document as untrusted.
Such a facility will further the goals of defending the web infrastructure from
the ongoing spate of cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks.
The absence of such a facility has forced web developers to employ content
ﬁltering as the primary defense against XSS. Unfortunately, precise content ﬁl-
tering is made diﬃcult by anomalous web browser parsing behaviors, which are
often used as vectors for successful XSS attacks.
We describe an experimental approach and tool called BluePrint that is
designed to isolate content in widely deployed existing web browsers, despite
anomalous browser behavior. We highlight the strengths of this approach as well
as its costs.
Joint work with Mike Ter Louw and Prithvi Bisht
Keywords: XSS, script injection, cross-site scripting, isolation, untrusted con-
tent, ﬁltering
Is your web page malicious or you're just happy to see me?
Giovanni Vigna (Univ. California - Santa Barbara, US)
JavaScript is a browser scripting language that allows developers to create so-
phisticated client-side interfaces for web applications. However, JavaScript code
is also used to carry out attacks against the user's browser and its extensions.
These attacks usually result in the download of additional malware that takes
complete control of the victim's platform, and are therefore called "drive-by
downloads." Unfortunately, the dynamic nature of the JavaScript language and
its tight integration with the browser make it diﬃcult to detect and block mali-
cious JavaScript code.
In this talk, we review current web security research carried out at UC Santa
Barbara, focusing on an approach to the detection and analysis of malicious
JavaScript code. This approach combines anomaly detection with emulation to
automatically identify malicious JavaScript code and support its analysis.
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We developed a system that uses a number of features and machine-learning
techniques to establish the characteristics of normal JavaScript code. Then, dur-
ing detection, the system is able to identify anomalous JavaScript code by em-
ulating its behavior and comparing it to the established proﬁles. In addition to
identifying malicious code, the system is able to support the analysis of obfus-
cated code and generate detection signatures for signature-based systems.
Keywords: Web Security, JavaScript, Malware
A Survey Study on Security in Application Development
John Wilander (Omegapoint AB - Stockholm, SE)
We've been teaching a professional course on web application security the last
two years. 12 course instances and about 120 participating developers from al-
most all sectors of IT  internet banking, internet gaming, health care systems,
e-learning, logistiscs etc. Apart from all the interesting discussions from these
courses we've been carrying out a survey collecting data on how security is pri-
oritized and sold in projects and businesses. The results are yet unpublished
but interesting. They give a picture of how security ﬁts in the web application
picture today.
Keywords: Application security, survey
A Cryptographic Compiler for Information-Flow Security
Cedric Fournet (Microsoft Research UK - Cambridge, GB)
We relate two notions of security: one simple and abstract, based on information
ﬂows in distributed programs, the other more concrete, based on cryptography.
In language-based security, conﬁdentiality and integrity policies specify the
permitted ﬂows of information between parts of a system with diﬀerent levels of
trust. These policies enable a simple treatment of security, but their enforcement
is delicate.
We consider cryptographic enforcement mechanisms for distributed programs
with untrusted components. Such programs may represent, for instance, dis-
tributed systems connected by some untrusted network. We develop a compiler
from a small imperative language with locality and security annotations down to
cryptographic implementations in F#. In source programs, security depends on
a policy for reading and writing the shared variables. In their implementations,
shared memory is unprotected, and security depends instead on encryption and
signing.
We show that our compiler preserves all information-ﬂow properties, un-
der standard cryptographic assumptions: an adversary that interacts with the
trusted components of our code and entirely controls its untrusted components
gains illegal information only with negligible probability.
Joint work of: Fournet, Cédric; le Guernic, Gurvan; Rezk, Tamara
